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The United States currently maintains an asymmetric ad-
vantage in the application of  economic pressure on part-
ners and adversaries to achieve its national goals, based on 
its immense economy and position in the middle of  the 
world’s economic activity. But, it is not certain that this 
advantage will persist in the future or that it will be as 
strong, as other countries expand and develop economi-
cally. Moreover, the lessons gleaned from the U.S. experi-
ence in its application of  sanctions over the past ten years 
could make them easier to use against the United States. 
By embracing targeted sanctions that achieve their effect 
primarily through the discrete application of  pressure on 
individuals and banks, the United States may have inad-
vertently shown future adversaries a way to apply pres-
sure on the United States without engaging in implausible, 
counterproductive, and mutually destructive countrywide 
sanctions initiatives. As with the use of  cyber warfare and 
drone strikes, the United States may find in the future that, 
having created a precedent that targeted sanctions are an 
appropriate response for all circumstances determined by 
the United States unilaterally, it is facing similar measures 
against its own companies, banks, and citizens.
Mindful of  these risks, this paper argues that the United 
States should consider the possibility and implications of  
such a global environment and adjust its sanctions policies 
accordingly. This should include efforts to:
1. Recognize that U.S. trade policy, regulation 
and sanctions can impact other countries in 
unintended ways and drive them away from 
the US and the international system it has 
fostered. To minimize such risks, the United 
States should take a more measured approach 
to using such tools and powers;
2. Conduct the necessary economic analysis 
of  short- and long-term implications of  
individual actions, as well as the net effect of  
all US sanctions programs;
3. Operate in a transparent manner so that US 
and international actors understand and can 
follow US sanctions steps;
4. Combat perceptions of  favoritism by creating 
regularity in the sanctions process and 
conform international practice to US efforts. 
This should include the adoption of  a public 
information period—akin to the Federal 
Register process—before broad categories of  
sanctions are imposed and making available 
licenses or similar “safe conduct” passes from 
the US government for foreign companies 
otherwise at risk of  sanctions; and,
5. Consider international approaches to 
sanctions regulation akin to international 
arms control efforts.
Similarly, I advise that companies with international 
operations should work now to identify their current 
vulnerabilities to future sanctions risks and consider 
ways to protect themselves, such as through the 
incorporation of  force majeure clauses into contracts 
within risky jurisdictions and insurance against the 
risk of  sanctions imposition.
By adapting its sanctions policies now, the United 
States may be able to change some aspects of  
the trajectory of  an otherwise prejudicial future 
international operating environment, preserving its 
ability to continue using sanctions as an effective 
foreign policy tool and improving their effectiveness.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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INTRODUCTION
Sanctions have the potential to be one of  the most 
powerful tools of  a state’s arsenal. They have been 
employed throughout world history (including in the 
Peloponnesian war), and, though disagreements exist as 
to exactly how effective sanctions are in achieving their 
desired objectives, there is little disagreement that they 
can produce significant results.
Over the past ten years, the United States has been 
the most active country in the world in the design, 
development, and imposition of  sanctions. US sanctions 
efforts have played a role in the undermining of  two 
substantial economies in the past five years alone: Iran 
and now Russia. As a direct consequence of  these 
successes, the perception of  sanctions by the international 
community and – critically -- US policymakers have 
changed radically, and they have become the preferred 
tool of  the US foreign policy establishment. When a 
crisis emerges internationally, there is almost always a call 
to impose sanctions on the offenders. Perhaps no other 
anecdotal sign is more telling of  the growing importance 
of  sanctions in foreign policy than the number of  
references made to them in the US National Security 
Strategy (NSS). This document, which is mandated 
to be produced in the National Security Act of  1947, 
as amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of  1986, 
presents the overall U.S. national security approach to be 
undertaken by the sitting President. In President Bush’s 
2002 NSS, sanctions were not mentioned. In 2015, more 
than half  a dozen separate mentions of  sanctions were 
made, with lengthy paragraphs to explain the role and 
context of  sanctions in the overall approach.
Discussions of  sanctions often fail to consider the fact 
that the United States is not the only country that can 
impose them or that its opportunity to impose sanctions 
may be a function of  a particularly conducive economic 
environment for US economic pressure. The 2015 NSS 
comes close, in its description of  present evolutions in 
international affairs that will affect US national security:
“. . . Power among states is more dynamic. The 
increasing use of  the G-20 on global economic 
matters reflects an evolution in economic 
power, as does the rise of  Asia, Latin America, 
and Africa. As the balance of  economic power 
changes, so do expectations about influence 
over international affairs. Shifting power 
dynamics create both opportunities and risks 
for cooperation, as some states have been more 
willing than others to assume responsibilities 
commensurate with their greater economic 
capacity. In particular, India’s potential, China’s 
rise, and Russia’s aggression all significantly 
impact the future of  major power relations.”1 
However, the NSS stops short of  acknowledging that, 
with rising and diverse economic power globally, there 
are costs and vulnerabilities for the United States as well 
as advantages. Some of  these vulnerabilities, ironically, 
may be the result of  the overuse of  US national 
economic power in its foreign policy and a complex 
regulatory environment that many increasingly judge to 
be extraterritorial in its application.
An effective strategy for economic statecraft would 
acknowledge these risks and seek to ameliorate them to 
the extent possible, thus preserving as many advantages 
for the practitioner as possible. In some cases, this is 
beyond the scope of  US foreign policy professionals, 
particularly if  the irritants at risk of  undermining US 
strength come from legislative mandates, tax systems, 
and similar national structures beyond their control. 
However, in the application of  sanctions, there are 
changes that could be made to US practices that—at a 
minimum—could avoid contributing to future national 
risk and—at a maximum—could ensure that foreign 
governments are less able to exert the same kind of  
national power at the expense of  the United States in 
the future.
This issue brief  represents an initial examination of  the 
possibility of  foreign sanctions being applied against the 
United States and strategies that the United States could 
use to reduce and manage this risk. It begins with an 
outline of  the strategic use of  US sanctions and lessons 
that foreign audiences may have gleaned from them. It 
then proceeds to describe the US economic situation 
internationally, highlighting the present vulnerability 
that the United States has—and US companies, more 
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specifically, have—to international sanctions. It then 
reviews two illustrative cases in which sanctions imposed 
by foreign countries could, over time, be applied to affect 
US economic interests and policies. Finally, it concludes 
with recommendations about the next steps that the 
United States ought to undertake to appropriately 
address this risk.
Importantly, this issue briefing does not argue against 
the further use of  sanctions by the United States. Rather, 
this briefing argues that sanctions are a powerful tool, but 
they are best used judiciously and carefully, mindful of  
the risk that today’s asymmetric advantage can become 
tomorrow’s asymmetric vulnerability.
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CONCEPTS IN US SANCTIONS
Previous Center on Global Energy Policy research has 
detailed at length the nature of  US sanctions against 
Iran, as well as against Russia.* This briefing will not 
repeat this description. Instead, in this section, I outline 
a few specific concepts that have formed the center of  
US sanctions policy over the last ten years. They are, in 
sum:
1. Use of  tailored sanctions tools that isolate 
vulnerabilities and apply maximum pressure;
2. Description of  sanctions as “defensive” 
measures rather than as offensive tools; and, 
3. Targeting companies and individuals, not 
countries, for specific bad acts or for 
supporting bad acts.
USE OF TAILORED SANCTIONS TOOLS THAT 
ISOLATE VULNERABILITIES AND APPLY MAXIMUM 
PRESSURE
One of  the characteristics of  modern US sanctions 
efforts is that they rarely involve cookie-cutter 
approaches. Instead, the pattern is that the United States 
has designed sanctions tools that apply specifically 
designed pressure on specifically designed targets. This 
strategy emerged from years of  less successful sanctions 
efforts in situations as diverse as Iraq in the 1990s—
where sanctions damaged the local economy but not 
the stability of  Saddam Hussein and, some would argue, 
may have sustained his rule—and in response to nuclear 
weapons tests by India and Pakistan in 1998.
Sanctioners now tend to focus on trying to apply 
discrete pressure on discrete vulnerabilities as well as 
on how US advantages can be applied. For example, the 
sanctions imposed against Iran’s financial institutions 
in 2010 through the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability and Divestment Act (CISADA) relied on 
subtle design and pinpoint application of  pressure on 
foreign banks. Through CISADA, the United States was 
able to pressure foreign banks to not do business with 
specifically designated Iranian banks at the risk of  their 
ability to have correspondent account relationships with 
US banks. Doubtless many in the foreign policy arena 
were unaware of  the term “correspondent account” 
prior to the passage of  CISADA (though it was part 
of  the USA PATRIOT Act). It refers to the system 
of  relationships that permit the international financial 
system to function with ease.2 But, through these few 
words, the US Treasury Department was able to leverage 
access to the entire US financial system in order to 
persuade foreign banks to stop doing business with a 
few isolated Iranian banks.
The results were dramatic: From 2010 to 2012, third-
party banks stopped doing business with Iranian banks 
in droves. In that period, only two third-party banks 
were found to be engaged in transactions in violation of  
CISADA: Elaf  Bank (Iraq) and Kunlun Bank (China). 
Kunlun remains under US sanctions today; Elaf  Bank 
was able to extricate itself  in 2013. Although it is 
certainly possible that a few banks escaped US notice, 
the likelihood is that banks found the idea of  being cut 
off  from the United States sufficiently risky so as to 
force them to quit Iran. By being so precise, the United 
States had the same effect as a blanket set of  prohibitions 
might have, but with less draconian phraseology and 
more artful application.
The targeting of  the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) in the 2012 Iran 
Threat Reduction Act (TRA) had a similar intent and 
effect. SWIFT is the system by which modern banks 
process the instructions that make international finance 
efficient. Seen prior to 2012 as roughly analogous to the 
Internet or to phone lines, US sanctions targeted Iran’s 
ability to use SWIFT by making a compelling argument: 
SWIFT provides financial services. As it is based in 
Belgium, it is subject to European Union legislation, 
which prohibits financial services being supplied to 
certain Iranian banks. Therefore, SWIFT should not 
provide financial services to these banks. Under TRA, 
__________________
* See the Center’s webpage for the Economic Statecraft, Sanctions, and Energy Markets program for a comprehensive listing: 
http://energypolicy.columbia.edu/research/featured-topic-economic-statecraft-sanctions-and-energy-markets.
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SWIFT was threatened with being denied the ability to 
operate in the United States and, effectively, with being 
shut down if  it did not stop conducting transactions 
with entities that were supposedly persona non grata in 
Europe. The result: the EU passed legislation, clarifying 
that the denial of  financial services included access to 
financial messaging services like SWIFT.
Of  course, Iran is not the only instance in which the 
United States and its partners applied clever and incisive 
sanctions tools to significant effect:
• In Russia, for example, the prohibition on the 
extension of  credit to certain Russian entities and 
sectors for longer than thirty or ninety days has 
had the effect of  drying up those entities’ ability 
to finance internationally. This, in combination 
with the drop in oil prices, has undermined the 
availability of  hard currency in Moscow, led to 
the depreciation of  the ruble, and soured the 
overall business climate in Russia.
• In Myanmar, sanctions were imposed on its 
export of  a variety of  raw materials and natural 
resources by the United States, European 
Union, and other likeminded partners. In part 
in response to the denial of  aid and investment 
created by the sanctions (even though some 
countries did not cooperate with the sanctions 
campaign), Myanmar has taken a variety of  
political steps intended to assuage international 
concerns and relieve the sanctions.
• In Libya, the United States responded to then-
leader Qaddhafi’s attacks against his own people 
by freezing the assets of  the Libyan regime and 
Qaddhafi’s family and senior advisors. Libya’s 
sovereign wealth was directly targeted, as much 
of  it was located in Western banks. The result 
was that Libya quickly lost access to billions of  
assets.3 
Though other examples could also be cited, the point 
is that sanctions employed by the United States and its 
partners over the past decade demonstrate an ability to 
isolate particular vulnerabilities and to apply pressure 
against them, even in seemingly novel ways, without 
necessarily using countrywide sanctions.
DESCRIPTION OF SANCTIONS AS “DEFENSIVE” 
MEASURES RATHER THAN OFFENSIVE TOOLS
Today, US rhetoric increasingly matches the reality of  
what sanctions are intended to do: deter aggression and 
impose consequences on those who violate international 
norms. But in the early days of  the renewed US sanctions 
campaign, the focus was almost exclusively on the need 
to protect the US financial system from abuse. Flashes 
of  this earlier message occasionally reappear in speeches 
and announcements of  sanctions. Examples abound:
• During a budget hearing in early March 2015, 
Treasury Secretary Lew described the use of  
financial intelligence, sanctions policy, and 
enforcement activities as playing “a significant 
role in protecting our financial system from 
threats to national security.”4 
• The Treasury Department described the 
aforementioned CISADA as such: “CISADA is 
consistent with the global consensus regarding 
Iranian behavior and is in line with the US 
Government’s core role of  protecting its 
domestic financial system from exposure to 
Iran’s illicit and deceptive financial practices.”5
• The White House declared that US sanctions 
against Venezuela on March 9, 2015, were—
in part—intended to protect “the US financial 
system from the illicit financial flows from public 
corruption in Venezuela.”6 
• And, of  course, the aforementioned USA 
PATRIOT Act of  2001 contained Section 311, 
which explicitly focused on preventing misuse 
of  the US financial system to support terrorism.7 
The United States has also successfully encouraged 
international partners to take up the chorus. For 
instance, the Financial Action Task Force frequently 
urges members to take steps to “protect their financial 
systems” by, among other things, isolating them from 
Iranian and other bad actors.8  
Such efforts are legitimate. It is true that those who 
seek to use the international financial system for illicit 
purposes undermine the integrity of  that system and 
make it harder for normal, legitimate business to take 
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place. As such, without the efforts of  the United States 
and its partners to ensure the global financial system is—
in general—a safe place in which to conduct business, 
international financial institutions’ ability to conduct 
appropriate due diligence in conducting transactions on 
behalf  of  customers would be compromised.
That said, the focus on the use of  sanctions as a defensive 
instrument does create precedents that others can use. 
After all, though the United States is able to defend its 
decision to deem this or that international problem as a 
threat meriting a sanctions response, such decisions may 
appear capricious or even cynical to others. (Nowhere 
is this more the case than in the area of  human rights 
sanctions, which have been notoriously difficult to defend 
publicly, less because there is disagreement that human 
rights violations need a response and more because 
similar bad acts in different contexts are ignored.)
As such, while appealing to the defensive nature of  certain 
sanctions, the United States can secure international 
support for its efforts but risks a similar determination 
going against it in the future. After all, “defense” can be 
liberally interpreted.
TARGETING COMPANIES AND INDIVIDUALS, NOT 
COUNTRIES, FOR SPECIFIC BAD ACTS OR FOR 
SUPPORTING BAD ACTS
Of  course, one of  the ways in which the United States 
has sought to manage international frustration with its 
sanctions policy is to focus its efforts on individual bad 
actors and the activities that they undertake.
In earlier incarnations of  sanctions policy, entire 
countries were often the focus of  sanctions. Individuals 
and companies may have been isolated for particular 
punishment, but it was usually in the context of  a 
broader, comprehensive embargo. Noted sanctions 
researchers Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg found 
in a survey of  all of  the sanctions cases in the twentieth 
century after World War I, only in twenty out of  174 
were “smart sanctions”—for example, arms embargoes, 
asset freezes, and travel sanctions—used outside the 
framework of  a comprehensive embargo.9 They further 
found that, even in these twenty cases (nine of  which 
were imposed since 1990), “the sanctions targeted on 
individuals or groups were almost always imposed in 
combination with selective export restrictions or aid 
restrictions.”10 In other words, out of  all of  the sanctions 
imposed in the twentieth century, 88 percent used blunt 
economic pressure in order to achieve their results, while 
only 12 percent used a more selective approach.
This bias has shifted over the last ten years. Though 
certainly there remain many broad-brush sanctions 
regimes—against Iran and Cuba, for example—this is 
no longer the norm. Regimes as diverse as North Korea, 
Syria, Venezuela, Zimbabwe and Russia have instead 
been targeted with discrete measures for individual bad 
acts.
Selectivity serves three main purposes. First, it helps to 
create a substantive backing for the sanctions action, 
which is necessary to sell it internationally and gain 
support from partners. Second, it makes the imposition 
of  sanctions a more targeted act, ideally sharpening 
sanctions pressure on a particular point. And, third, it 
ameliorates to some degree the nature of  the resulting 
confrontation between states that results from a 
sanctions action. Taking aside for a moment whether 
this approach works, the point is that a general norm 
of  focusing sanctions on those who have engaged in 
misdeeds has been reinforced by US actions over the last 
ten years.
US sanctions against Iran have taken this approach 
to the next level by also threatening action against 
individuals and entities that do business with individuals 
and entities under US sanctions (specifically those on 
the US Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked 
Persons or “SDN” list). This enhancement of  sanctions 
from CISADA, as described previously, puts at risk the 
financial interests of  foreign companies while leaving 
their governments alone. This company-based approach, 
as noted, disincentivizes bad behavior without, in theory, 
requiring the intervention of  foreign governments in their 
company’s business activities. This concept increases the 
potential avenues for applying pressure on adversaries 
and thus also expands the foreign policy operating space 
of  the US government. Even if  a foreign government 
is disinclined to be cooperative, its businesses may feel 
differently. By focusing sanctions on businesses—which 
in most cases make the actual decisions about trade 
volumes absent international legal requirements—the 
United States was able to advance its policy interests in a 
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new fashion. But, this development also means that the 
United States has endorsed the principle that bringing 
businesses into international disputes is an acceptable 
way of  exerting statecraft.
At the same time, of  course, larger disputes among 
states—particularly partners—are minimized. Consider 
the Central Bank of  Iran/oil sanctions put in place 
against Iran in 2011: they required actions on the parts 
of  states (overall crude oil purchase reductions) to 
indemnify actions on the part of  entities (transactions 
with the CBI). From the perspective of  simplicity, it 
would have been arguably more efficient to simply 
threaten the opposite country with sanctions than to 
threaten individual actors in that country’s economy. In 
such a concept, the United States would not have had 
to deal with the problem of  intransigent companies and 
could instead have focused its attention on the opposite 
government. But, of  course, this also raises the stakes 
tremendously for the imposition of  sanctions. Choosing 
to impose sanctions on a seemingly random Chinese 
bank is less aggressive than imposing sanctions on all of  
China’s financial sector, and with less risk of  unintended 
consequences. This has advantages from a sanctions 
enforcement perspective. But, it also establishes a very 
clear precedent that a state can maintain its overall (and 
profitable) trade ties with a country hosting a sanctioned 
entity, and therefore that sanctions are less costly to 
impose from the standpoint of  the originator.
Perhaps more interesting, the definition of  what 
constitutes supporting a bad act has changed over time 
and as circumstances warrant. For example, in the case 
of  Iran, the initial sanctions position was that those 
supporting Iran’s nuclear program directly were at risk. 
Then, sanctions efforts focused on those providing 
services in support of  the program followed by sanctions 
efforts on those providing services for those providing 
services to the program. This ever-widening net then 
targeted those supporting Iranian industries, culminating 
in June 2013 with sanctions against those who sell parts 
for the manufacture of  automobiles in Iran due to the 
contribution the auto sector could make to the overall 
Iranian economy. The result became a secondary boycott, 
but gradually and over time. The present sanctions focus 
on Russian energy companies—which ostensibly have 
little to do with the crisis in Ukraine—shows the same 
characteristics as the early days of  the US sanctions 
campaign against Iran.
Ultimately, the lesson learned here is that companies 
could be held liable for even innocuous-sounding 
interactions with bad actors, so long as the foreign policy 
interests of  the sanctioning country support it.
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United States China 
US ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL WORLD
Modern US sanctions efforts would not have been 
possible were it not for the economic supremacy of  
the United States in the post–Cold War world. The 
United States emerged as the undisputed leader of  the 
free economic world after the Second World War. After 
the Cold War ended with the collapse of  the Soviet 
Union, the US-sponsored economic system became 
the unchallenged architecture for global finance. At the 
center throughout this time were a number of  institutions 
and practices that reinforced the centrality of  the United 
States, among these the use of  the US dollar as the global 
reserve currency.
Many observers think this US economic supremacy is 
waning, even if  at a slow rate. They point to the market 
collapses of  2001 and 2008, as well as the rise of  new 
transnational institutions in Europe and Asia. It is true 
that the global economy is more diverse today than 
twenty years ago. Further analysis of  the shifts in global 
financial power and what it means for the broader US 
economy are beyond the scope of  this paper, which 
accepts as given that—in all likelihood—China and other 
emerging markets will create counterweights to the US 
economy in the coming decades. Figure 1 describes this 
in simplistic terms, reflecting the analysis developed by 
the Economist Intelligence Unit of  nominal GDP in the 
United States and China through 2050. This chart makes 
clear that, at some point around 2025, the size of  the 
Chinese economy will likely exceed that of  the United 
States, and that that gap will expand dramatically in the 
decades that follow. Today, China’s economy is 60–65 
percent the size of  the US economy in nominal GDP 
terms. By 2050, expectations are that the situation will 
be reversed. The size of  the gap between the economies 
could be larger than the gap between the US economy 
today and in 2040.
If  realized (and there is some possibility that the trends 
are exaggerated in our present forecasting), this will have 
implications for the use of  the US economy for strategic 
ends. The 2015 NSS acknowledged this when it noted 
that “despite its success, our rules-based system is now 
competing against alternative, less-open models . . .” and 
that “we must be strategic in the use of  our economic 
strength to set new rules of  the road, strengthen our 
partnerships, and promote inclusive development.”11 
Figure 1: Comparison of  US and China nominal GDP  
(In billions of  US dollars)
Source: Haver Analytics/EIU, Extracted on March 20, 2015.
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But, this may be easier said than done in a world in 
which the US economy is no longer dominant and 
simultaneously sees the results of  foreign investment as 
important to US economic performance.
US-earned income abroad is considered to be an 
important aspect of  the overall balancing of  the US 
current account deficit. A paper by the two economists at 
the Board of  Governors of  the Federal Reserve in 2012 
that examined the accounting and economics behind this 
thinking, noted that:
The income received on the US external 
position plays an important role in one of  
the biggest issues confronting international 
macroeconomists—the sustainability (or lack 
thereof) of  the US current account deficit. Net 
income receipts, which equaled 33% of  the 
goods and services balance in 2010, provide 
a significant stabilizing force for the current 
account. Future sustainability will depend, in 
part, on the persistence of  these net income 
receipts.12 
Moreover, between 2000 and 2013, US Gross National 
Income (GNI) derived from international investments 
grew from 1 percent to 3 percent of  GNI (see Figure 
2). An increase in the value of  international investment 
from 1 to 3 percent of  US GNI might not seem like 
a lot, taken in comparison to the overall size of  the 
US economy. However, in 2013, it accounted for $439 
billion. For purposes of  illustration, that is larger than 
the nominal GDP of  all but the top 28 economies in the 
world.13 
And, of  course, this is just a measure of  the national 
income derived from foreign investment, not a 
complete picture of  the investments abroad made by 
US companies (and, therefore, what they have at risk 
abroad). The US Direct Investment Abroad position in 
2013 was $4.6 trillion. (To put this in perspective, the 
total market capitalization of  the NY Stock Exchange 
was $16.6 trillion at the time of  this writing.)14  Though 
most of  this was in Europe (around $2.6 trillion), there is 
some measure of  diversity in US companies’ investment 
holdings, reflecting the global nature of  US business. 
This also means that US companies are exposed to 
potential foreign sanctions risk around the world, even 
if  they are themselves not doing anything most people 








































































































US GNI Derived from International Investments (Percent) 
Figure 2: US GNI derived from international investments  
(Percent)
Source: US Bureau of  Economic Analysis, Department of  Commerce.
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At the same time, there are ample indications that US 
policy efforts—including sanctions as well as frustrations 
with a wide range of  other US actions—could be 
souring international interest in the United States. On 
a seemingly daily basis, press stories outline the myriad 
ways in which foreign governments and businesses are 
seeking to diversify the risks of  too much partnership 
and trade with the United States. Three recent stories 
will help demonstrate this point:
• Total seeking reliable, alternative financing 
for natural gas investments in Russia:  Press 
reports, including quotes from Total’s chief  
executive, Patrick Pouyanne, indicate that 
the French energy company is “seeking the 
equivalent of  up to $15 billion from Chinese 
investors to finance its part of  the development 
of  a giant gas field in Russia due to US 
sanctions.”15 Pouyanne noted that “we would 
have preferred to do it with dollars” but that 
the imposition of  US sanctions against Russia 
forced Total to consider alternative means of  
financing the project.16 Neither US nor EU 
sanctions explicitly target natural gas, though 
Russian energy companies have been themselves 
subject to financing-related sanctions.
• China infrastructure investment bank draws 
in US partners: China’s bid to create an Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has 
received new support from Australia, France, 
Germany, Italy, South Korea, and the United 
Kingdom, partially in response to frustrations 
with US failure to support reforms at the 
international financial institutions that would 
give emerging countries greater say.17 The 
development of  the Chiang Mai initiative 
in Southeast Asia can also be seen as a 
similar development. Treasury Secretary Lew 
“acknowledged that the failure by Congress 
to agree to a ‘very mild and reasonable’ set of  
reforms of  the IMF had prompted countries 
to look elsewhere.’”18 Washington is concerned 
about this bank because of  the risk that it will 
lessen the standard safeguards of  “transparency, 
creditworthiness, environmental sustainability, 
and concern for labor and human rights that 













Asia and Pacific 
Figure 3: US direct investment position abroad in 2013 
Source: US Bureau of  Economic Analysis, Department of  Commerce.
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grow frustrated that US inaction has forced 
them to join China at the AIIB to unlock China’s 
large foreign reserves for investment.
• Argentine bond payments blocked by US 
judicial process: Argentina, which was long-
ago sued by a small group of  “holdout” hedge 
fund managers in New York for full repayment 
on bonds that had been restructured after its 
2001 default, was nearly prevented from making 
regular interest payments on its restructured 
debt. Citibank was prohibited by a federal district 
court judge in Manhattan from making interest 
payments on behalf  of  Argentina to investors 
holding $2.3 billion in Argentine notes until 
Argentina paid the “holdout” hedge funds.20 
Described by the New York Times as “a move 
that reverberated through the international 
debt markets,” this decision could have had 
the practical effect of  forcing Argentina to 
default on its debt and forcing Citibank to 
choose between breaking US law or breaking 
local Argentine law. The decision was reversed 
on March 22, permitting Citibank to make 
the necessary interest payments on behalf  of  
Argentina,21 but overall, the decision may lead 
sovereign bond issuers to avoid a US nexus to 
prevent a situation in which the application of  
US law forces default or an intermediary into an 
impossible legal quagmire. Citi itself  has paid a 
price for this, as its decision to make the interest 
payments was interpreted by the Argentine 
government as serving the interests of  the hedge 
fund managers rather than Argentine investors; 
Citi Argentina’s ability to trade in the country’s 
capital markets was suspended on March 27.22 
Each of  these incidents points to a certain amount of  
US overreach that undermines the future US use of  
economic statecraft and even sanctions. Moreover, by 
legitimizing such tools, the United States risks them 
being used against US firms in the future.
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TURN-ABOUT IS FAIR PLAY
The United States may find over time that its ability 
to impose its will upon the international system by 
economic means has been dramatically reduced. This 
alone would reduce the impact and effectiveness of  
sanctions, prompting some to disregard diktats from 
Washington.
It is also possible that the United States could itself  
become subject to international sanctions pressure. This 
theory, which is sometimes (and in oddly American-centric 
fashion) referred to as “reverse sanctions,” postulates 
that, over time, other economies will become sufficiently 
robust so as not to require trade with the United States 
or—at a minimum—to be prepared to sacrifice some 
portion of  their economic interests in the United States 
in order to exert political pressure on it. This has been 
occasionally raised in the context of  Chinese holding of  
US sovereign debt, but often without recognition that it 
is hardly in the purely economic interest of  an investor 
in US treasuries to seek the erosion of  the value of  its 
investment.
It is true, however, that over time, the degree to which 
the United States is dependent on good economic ties 
with partners for its growth will also impede the US 
ability to freely use its economy to generate pressure on 
those partners. This is common sense: it is far easier to 
exert pressure on countries that are wholly dependent 
upon a sanctioner than it is to exert pressure on those 
independent of  the sanctioner. The United States found 
this in the early 2000s with Iran and remedied the 
situation by seeking to impose pressure on those with 
whom Iran still did business in Europe and in East Asia. 
By doing so, the United States leveraged its stronger 
relationship with Europe (and its companies’ stronger 
integration with European ones) to create political 
pressure against Iran.
It is therefore worth considering whether, in a future 
scenario, the same could be done with respect to the 
United States and using aspects of  the concepts that 
underpinned US sanctions over the past ten years. 
To recap, they are: use of  tailored sanctions tools; 
description of  sanctions as “defensive”; and targeting 
companies and individuals, not countries.
The following are two scenarios that have been developed 
to help demonstrate the point that, over time, the United 
States or its key companies and banks could be forced 
into a choice between doing business in one country 
(or economic bloc) and business in another. Though 
entirely suppositional, they draw upon existing political 
problems and differences between the United States and 
two global trading partners: China (as relates to Taiwan) 
and the European Union (as relates to Israel). Of  course, 
by developing these scenarios, this assessment is not 
endorsing either of  them. To the contrary, I believe that 
sanctions are inappropriate in either case and that the US 
response to such steps would need to be substantial to 
protect our economic and political interests.  
Nor is this assessment intended to suggest that either 
scenario will necessarily come to pass.  For purposes 
of  expediency, these scenarios omit altogether any real 
consideration of  whether these US partners would 
actually decide to impose a sanctions regime affecting 
US interests—purposefully ignoring the fact that 
both China and the EU have historically opposed the 
development of  what they deem to be extraterritorial 
sanctions regimes—in order to focus on whether or not 
they could do so.  
Last, both of  these scenarios deliberately dodge the 
question of  how coalition politics might influence the 
decision to apply sanctions or the US ability to undermine 
them.  It is certainly possible that the United States 
could respond to a decision by either China or the EU 
by seeking to develop a coalition to oppose the moves in 
question.  It is even possible that such an arrangement 
could undermine the efforts of  the sanctioners or 
deter them from going forward with the sanctions in 
question.  However, abstracting out beyond what is 
already contained in these scenarios requires making 
assumptions about future behavior that is difficult to 
model credibly and any attempt to do so would probably 
create an impression of  precision that is unfounded. For 
example, to be truly accurate in predicting European 
behavior and a US countermove we would have to make 
assumptions whether, for instance, Greece remains in 
the euro and the UK in the EU.  The point of  these 
examples is not to create ironclad predictions of  realistic 
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future behavior. It is rather to demonstrate that our 
assumptions about whether these scenarios are even 
remotely possible may need to be re-examined in light of  
future economic potentialities and the lessons countries 
and groups may learn from the US sanctions experience.
CHINA-TAIWAN
One need not be a foreign policy expert to know that 
the status of  Taiwan remains a potential flashpoint of  
tension between the United States and China. Though 
the United States adopted a “One China” policy in the 
1970s, it simultaneously reaffirmed its commitment to 
the defense of  Taiwan and has reinforced this with arms 
sales since that time. For China, Taiwan’s status remains 
a perpetual sore and, according to the Annual Report 
by the Department of  Defense on Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of  China 
in 2013, “Preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan 
Strait, which includes deterring or defeating third-party 
intervention, remains the focus and primary driver of  
China’s military investment.”23 And, of  course, for the 
people of  Taiwan, there remains a constant tension 
between a desire for independence and a well-reasoned 
interest in trade and cultural links with the mainland.
It is therefore entirely conceivable that, at some point 
in the future, a crisis could erupt between China and 
Taiwan. Most US planning has focused on this crisis 
having a military aspect or, as of  late, perhaps a cyber 
warfare aspect. However, it is also conceivable that China 
could design a sanctions regime against Taiwan. Such a 
regime could incorporate lessons from the US sanctions 
approach. For example, China could develop a targeted 
sanctions regime against Taiwan that forbids access to 
Chinese markets by any company that invests in Taiwan’s 
electronics, machinery and petrochemicals sectors 
(described in CIA World Factbook as the drivers of  the 
Taiwanese economy).24 China’s own substantial imports 
from Taiwan—which the Factbook notes represents 27 
percent of  Taiwan’s exports—could support a robust 
sanctions effort on Taiwan, but China may feel that it 
is appropriate to seek external sources of  pressure to 
complement its own.
Even if  China never sought to engage the US government 
to support its efforts or to impose sanctions on trade with 
the United States (which would probably be profoundly 
damaging to its own interests), such an externally 
applied, secondary sanctions regime could force US 
companies to dramatically reconsider their investment 
decisions and cooperation with Taiwan. Figure 4 shows 
how US GNI derived from direct investment in the 


































Figure 4: Comparison of  US GNI derived from direct investment in China/Hong Kong and Taiwan 
(In billions of  US dollars) 
Source: US Bureau of  Economic Analysis, Department of  Commerce. Note: Holding company data was excluded from 
these graphs to make a clearer picture as to the direct economic value of  the relationship.
ISSUE BRIEF: THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
16 |  CENTER ON GLObAL ENERGY POLICY | COLUMbIA SIPA
Moreover, the US investment position is similarly 
skewed to China and Hong Kong, as opposed to Taiwan. 
In 2013, the US investment position in China and Hong 
Kong was valued at $120 billion ($61 billion and $59 
billion, respectively), versus a little less than $17 billion 
in Taiwan.25 
US companies are already at risk to possible Chinese 
sanctions over Taiwan based on their present investment 
position. However, if  we consider this scenario in 
ten years’ time, when the US and Chinese economies 
are predicted to be roughly the same size, then it is 
straightforward to imagine an even greater vulnerability 
at that time. And, of  course, this problem would become 
magnified in the years that followed.
EUROPEAN UNION-ISRAEL 
A different sort of  scenario could play out in Europe. 
Predictions that the European Union would overtake 
the United States in economic clout have been set 
aside given the turbulence that has afflicted the Euro 
area since 2008 (which also serves as a reminder that 
the projections about China’s economic ascent could 
similarly disappoint). It nonetheless remains the case 
that the European Union is both a significant economic 
power in its own right and that its trade and investment 
ties with the United States are substantial. As noted 
previously, around 56 percent of  the overall $4.6 trillion 
US investment position abroad stems from investment 
in Europe.
It is also true that the United States and the European 
Union are frequently on the same side of  many global 
issues. To some extent, this reflects a shared political 
heritage and strategic outlook following World War II. 
There are also broad cultural and social ties that lend 
themselves to more common viewpoints on issues 
such as human rights. That said, there are divisions in 
European and US opinions on many international and 
domestic issues (e.g., capital punishment, gun control, 
and economic equality). One area of  potentially dramatic 
future discord lies in the Middle East, specifically with 
respect to perspectives on Israel and Palestine.  
Public opinion polling in Europe is generally against Israel 
and blames Israel for the conflict with the Palestinians.26 
This is not the case in the United States (nor, to be sure, 
is this a uniform opinion within Europe).
Over time and absent any improvement in the situation, 
Israel may find itself  further isolated in Europe as a general 
matter. This is not mere speculation: The Economist 
reported that Israel’s finance minister in 2014, Yair 
Lapid, said that, if  negotiations with the Palestinians fail 
and a European boycott was arranged, even partially, ten 
thousand Israelis would “immediately” lose their jobs. 
He calculated that trade with the EU would slump by a 
third.27 More recently, press reports indicate that a leaked 
document prepared by EU diplomats may encourage 
consideration of  European sanctions against Israel for 
“heavy-handed” approaches to the Palestinians.28 .29 It is 
reasonably certain that no such document exists in the 
United States, though the growing divestment movement 
on US university campuses suggests that a European 
drift away from Israel and the United States is neither 
as far-fetched as it may seem nor would the Europeans 
be as isolated in their sentiments as perhaps in the past.
It is also possible that, in such a scenario, the European 
Union could decide to impose more sweeping sanctions 
against Israel, for example by prohibiting investment by 
European companies in Israel or particular sectors of  
the Israeli economy. An extensive document prepared by 
the European Commission on the EU-Israel economic 
relationship makes clear that sanctions against Israel 
would be costly to Europe as a whole: Israel is the EU’s 
twenty-eighth largest trading partner, responsible for 29 
billion euros in trade in 2013.30 However, as with the US-
led sanctions efforts against Russia and Iran, a decision 
to apply sanctions need not automatically extend to 
trade across the board. It is conceivable that a selective 
and highly focused boycott—for example, on any 
goods determined to have been produced in territories 
beyond the 1967 borders of  Israel or by companies 
with substantial investments in those areas—could 
apply pressure and due diligence requirements stringent 
enough to chill European business.
Europe could also decide to export its sanctions policies. 
This would be decidedly contrary to the EU’s normal 
inclinations. The EU, in fact, has opposed US sanctions 
that seek to modify behavior beyond US borders as 
extraterritorial. However, policy inclinations have been 
known to change.
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Were the EU to determine that secondary sanctions were 
desirable, US companies would have a tough decision to 
make on economic grounds, as Figure 5 demonstrates.
As with the China–Taiwan scenario, the EU–
Israel scenario would also put front and center the 
disproportionate economic weight of  US investments in 
Europe versus Israel: $2.6 trillion in Europe as compared 
to $9.5 billion in Israel.31 
Of  course, as discussed earlier, such a scenario would be 
a significant departure from past EU practice and would 
constitute a very significant step politically. However, 
from a European domestic political perspective, it would 
likely not be an unpopular one at home (especially 
if  Europe is still struggling to manage its internal 
relationships with its diverse immigrant populations). 
Consequently, the decision to impose such a sanctions 
regime could be less difficult to arrange than might 
otherwise be expected. 
Assuming of  course that internal European politics were 
to be overcome in support of  such an audacious response, 
the primary international objection would doubtless 
come from the United States, which—notwithstanding 
current frustrations with the Israeli government—
would almost certainly resist such a move. One could 
easily imagine a scenario in which counter-sanctions 
are imposed against the European Union by the United 
States, the converse situation from 1996, when the US 
imposition of  sanctions on those investing in Cuba 
(via the Helms-Burton Act) and Iran and Libya (via the 
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act) prompted the EU to pass 
legislation that prohibited European companies from 
complying with extraterritorial law. Still, US companies 
with an interest in Israel would have to make a decision 
about their economic interests in Europe, which could 
have a chilling effect on Israeli trade even beyond what 






































Comparison of U.S. GNI Derived from Direct Investment  
in the EU and Israel 
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Figure 5: Comparison of  US GNI derived from direct investment in the EU and Israel 
(In billions of  US dollars) 
Source: US Bureau of  Economic Analysis, Department of  Commerce.
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One could (wrongly) take from the preceding analysis 
the conclusion that international trade is the problem, 
exposing the United States as it does to the vagaries 
and whims of  foreign governments to impose sanctions 
and pressure upon it. This is a risk in engaging in any 
international trade or, for that matter, trade of  any sort. 
But, trade is sustained by a sense that there are rules and 
predictability built into the system; this was one of  the 
fundamental messages of  the 2015 NSS. It is possible 
that, through overuse of  sanctions in combination 
with other structural issues, the United States could 
undermine the very system it has designed and nurtured 
over the last seventy years.
There are three paths available to the United States in 
response to this possibility and risk:
1. It can ignore the possibility that its actions 
will have future consequences and proceed 
along its current path, confident that the size 
and strength of  the US economy will protect 
it from future risks.
2. It can abandon the use of  its economy and 
markets for statecraft purposes, reducing its 
reliance on sanctions tools and becoming more 
acquiescent to foreign economic interests.
3. It can acknowledge that with its actions come 
consequences and therefore that a holistic 
approach ought to be taken to ensure that the 
combination of  sanctions tools, economic 
development and aid policies, and other forms 
of  economic statecraft it employs are calculated 
to fulfill the president’s vision of  a “strategic” 
use of  US economic strength.32 
The first path, frankly, is reckless and assumes a level of  
control over the international economy that is out of  
step with many projections for global economic growth 
and the US place in the international economy. The 
second path is unnecessarily defeatist and would deprive 
the United States of  a tool that it can use—and arguably 
has used—to address national security challenges 
through nonmilitary means, preserving US capabilities 
and credibility in the international community.
This assessment concludes that the third path is the 
only sensible response to the risks facing the United 
States in the future. This path balances an appropriate 
use of  an important tool against a sensible awareness of  
future risk, preserving US foreign policy options. But, 
this path requires work and adaptation of  the prevailing 
US sanctions approach. Coming from endemic, global 
economic trends as some of  the risk to the United States 
does, it is not possible to address such risks altogether. In 
addition, the United States is in no position now to put 
the genie back into the bottle with respect to how useful 
certain sanctions approaches can be. This knowledge 
is available and usable to those who may, in the future, 
have the leverage to employ in such a manner.  
That said, this does not mean that the US is simultaneously 
powerless to mitigate these risks to some degree. First, 
the United States can make sure that when it chooses to 
utilize sanctions, it does so in full, conscious awareness 
of  the consequences. Doing so may create pause before 
imposing sanctions in situations in which they are not 
the best tool and, even better, ensure that sanctions 
– if  used – are appropriately calibrated to achieve 
their desired end goal. Second, the United States can 
demonstrate leadership in making its sanctions decisions 
transparent and legible. Opponents may not agree with 
the use of  the tool but a well-articulated rationale for 
the sanctions actions undertaken as well as what they 
cover and for how long may go a long way in dispelling 
some of  the myths surrounding US sanctions. Third, the 
United States could standardize the processes through 
which it undertakes sanctions and ensure that foreign 
companies are treated fairly within a US sanctions regime 
that increasingly targets foreign economic behavior as 
well as the choices of  its own resident companies and 
individuals.  And, fourth, the United States can work to 
create global rules of  the road, potentially restraining its 
own power but while this power is at its peak, with all the 
leverage that comes along with it.
More specifically, I recommend:
1. The United States should recognize that its 
actions across a range of  economic issues 
are interrelated and may be driving countries 
AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE
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away from it and the international system 
altogether. 
This is not immediately obvious given US 
growth potentials and so forth. But, there is 
weariness in the international economy from 
dealing with the myriad of  US demands, policies 
and complaints. Coming as it does during a time 
of  global economic realignment, countries and 
companies have begun exploring a world without 
the US at the center. Although I believe many 
countries would find a move away from the US 
system would ultimately be to their detriment, 
there would also be a cost to the United States 
in real economic terms and in its ability to use 
its economic power for good. As such, it would 
be wise for there to be a real conversation 
between the branches of  government as to 
what US interests are in the global economy 
and how to prioritize what it does and when. 
Failing that, there should be a recognition that 
there are real limits to US power and that these 
limits can grow overtime due to changing global 
circumstances as well as US actions. Ultimately, 
executing effective economic statecraft 
requires careful use of  US economic statecraft. 
2. Conduct the necessary economic analysis 
of  short- and long-term implications 
of  individual actions, as well as the net 
effect of  all US sanctions programs. 
 
Future sanctions programs should come with an 
assessment of  the individual risk of  the program 
to the US and global economy, as well as an 
assessment of  the overall risks both near and 
long term. Presently, to create a new sanctions 
program, the president needs to determine 
pursuant to the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) that there is an 
international emergency that threatens the US 
national or economic security. The president is 
required to submit a report to Congress that 
outlines the nature of  the emergency and the 
actions taken, but there is no requirement for 
an assessment of  the economic consequences 
of  this decision. Such an assessment would be 
a prudent addition to the process and would 
demonstrate both to supporters and critics of  
the action that the various issues associated 
with a decision have been considered. Many 
times, the assessment might conclude that 
there is negligible economic impact, particularly 
immediately. For example, it is highly unlikely 
that sanctions against terrorist groups would 
have a negative impact on the US economy. But, 
conducting the review would add rigor to the 
process and could be adopted as an executive 
branch standard, if  not incorporated into an 
amendment of  IEEPA. Moreover, it would 
force the executive branch to come face to face 
with the reality that sanctions actions may have 
negative, unintended consequences.
Congress should also provide economic 
assessments of  the impact of  sanctions that it 
chooses to impose. As congressional enthusiasm 
for sanctions has increased over the past decade, 
there have been many claims made about the 
economic impact of  this sanction or another. 
However, though Congress often establishes 
reporting requirements on the executive branch 
to validate its decisions—for example, for 
exempting a party from sanctions—it is rare that 
Congress will commission authoritative reports 
on potential sanctions actions before deciding 
to pass the law requiring such sanctions. In the 
case of  the FY12 NDAA, Congress did provide 
the president with the ability to determine 
that sanctions would be detrimental to the US 
and global economy if  they upset oil prices 
and similarly commissioned the US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) to produce 
reports every two months on the state of  the oil 
market. This was a responsible and appropriate 
concession by Congress to the economic risks 
of  the sanctions being imposed and ought to 
be replicated in similar future sanctions laws 
in the form of  an overall US and international 
economic assessment.
3. Operate in a transparent manner so that 
US and international actors understand 
and can follow US sanctions steps. 
 
Sanctions actions ought to be taken with the 
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utmost possible transparency and explained in 
clear, straightforward language to those who ask. 
Sanctions have achieved some success from their 
direct action but potentially an even larger amount 
from the climate of  fear that is created from 
their imposition. This climate comes both from 
the threat that sanctions could be expanded to 
cover whatever business is not presently affected 
and from the ambiguous nature of  some of  the 
sanctions imposed. This is advantageous to US 
sanctioners, who can respond quickly to requests 
for clarity with a statement that “it is up to the 
business community to conduct the necessary 
due diligence and make its own decisions about 
sanctions risk,” but hardly illuminating from 
those who seek to cooperate but don’t know 
how. In the author’s time in government, he 
was frequently asked by businesses to answer 
simple “yes or no” questions about sanctions 
risk and just as frequently deferred those 
questions to avoid giving a stamp of  approval. 
While beneficial from an enforcement side, such 
unnecessary evasiveness simply perpetuated the 
sense that US sanctions efforts were attempts at 
“gotcha” games.
It is also possible that such practices undermine 
other US foreign policy initiatives involving the 
target at hand. Both Iran and Myanmar illustrate 
this point. In Iran, the United States had a direct 
interest in Iran receiving some benefit from 
the Joint Plan of  Action (JPOA) reached in 
November 2013. It is this benefit that would keep 
Iran interested in a comprehensive arrangement. 
At the same time, because of  concerns that Iran 
would take inordinate advantage of  the JPOA and 
criticism that the JPOA gave away too much, the 
United States aggressively messaged the risks of  
doing business outside of  the JPOA framework 
in early 2014, such that the Iranians complained 
that relief  was not extant. Adjustments were 
made in US messaging, and, as a result, Iran 
received some clear—but limited—benefit 
from the JPOA. In Myanmar, the United States 
has struggled to demonstrate that it remains 
concerned about the pace of  political progress in 
the country and the treatment of  the Rohingya, 
while at the same time welcoming responsible 
US investment in the country. Myanmar has 
received some benefit from the relaxation of  
US sanctions, but the lack of  clear, bright lines 
and ambiguity about the future of  business in 
Myanmar may contribute to lessened interest in 
investment there and, perversely, a lack of  direct 
benefit to the Burmese necessary to keep them 
on the reform path.
There is therefore a clear tension between the 
value of  ambiguity around the reach and extent 
of  US sanctions (creating deterrence) and the 
risk that—with an ever-expanding array of  
US sanctions programs—foreign interlocutors 
decide there is no good way to navigate the US 
system and decide not to play.
On balance, I believe that the power of  US 
sanctions comes in the risk that is presented to 
those targeted through them, not in clouding 
the nature of  what is covered. With this view in 
mind, US sanctions offices ought to publish clear 
standards and rules, in tenth-grade English, to 
outline what is covered by sanctions and what is 
not. This should not be prejudicial to sanctions 
efforts, provided that clear caveats are made as 
to the lack of  legal indemnification that would 
come from these descriptions and care was used 
in the drafting.
4. Combat perceptions of  favoritism by 
creating regularity in the process and 
conform international practice to US efforts. 
 
As noted, sanctions campaigns have benefited to 
a certain extent from the chilling effect created 
by uncertainty in the next target to be chosen. 
They have also benefited from the reality that 
international actors respect and respond to 
actions taken by the United States. But, the 
use of  sanctions has also come to be seen as 
capricious or, at a minimum, skewed to punish 
one group of  actors at the expense of  another. 
Frequently, while in government, the author’s 
entreaties to foreign governments to take action 
against serial violators of  US sanctions were 
met with responses such as: “But country X is 
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doing it, and you’re not stopping them.” Though 
the ability to use flexibility and discretion in 
the imposition of  sanctions is a vital, necessary 
element of  the tool, it does lend itself  to charges 
of  unpredictability.
Moreover, foreign companies have often seen 
the fact that, though both US and foreign 
companies can be subject to penalties for 
violations of  US sanctions, only US companies 
can receive specific licenses with which to 
operate. This breeds a powerful misconception 
that the United States uses sanctions to advance 
its economic interests. This is not true. But, 
given the prominence of  US businesses abroad 
and the common international practice of  
advocacy on behalf  of  national companies, it is 
a beguiling untruth.
The United States needs to combat all of  these 
risks in order to lessen the negative impression 
of  sanctions abroad. Two ideas could assist in 
this effort:
a. New sanctions measures should be subject 
to some kind of  public information period, 
akin to the Federal Register process or 
similar federal regulatory procedures. There 
could be a discussion period, in which 
interested parties could file comments with 
the sanctioning department and proposals 
could be modified or enhanced on the 
basis of  those comments. Such a discussion 
period could be limited to help preserve 
responsiveness to the national security threat 
prompting consideration of  sanctions—
perhaps to thirty days—but would permit 
those with an interest to offer their views.
 There are doubtless many conceptual 
frameworks that could be developed for 
such a process, but the idea would be to 
give public note of  an intended sanctions 
action and to permit public comments 
to be registered. This would not apply to 
individual designations, which should be 
kept confidential until unveiled so as to 
avoid asset flight, but it would be reasonable 
to give public notice of  the intent to create 
new sanctions authorities that could have a 
major impact on US and foreign business.
 The biggest risk from such a concept would 
be that foreign adversaries become witting 
of  the sanctions steps being contemplated 
by the administration and take steps to 
counter them. This is a real problem, 
though not without its advantages. Indeed, 
one could argue that the deterrent effect of  
US sanctions would be enhanced by such 
a process, as it would give the government 
an opportunity to show more of  its cards 
in an escalating diplomatic confrontation 
but without having to deploy them while 
diplomacy goes on. Moreover, congressional 
sanctions are not made in secret and have 
served similar purposes in the past.
 But, these virtues aside, there is some risk that 
imaginative sanctions—such as those that 
targeted Qaddhafi in 2011–2012—would be 
undermined with this proposal. Therefore, 
this should be promulgated as a guideline to 
be followed, not as a legal requirement, so 
that national security–sensitive exceptions 
could be made. One could easily imagine 
the decision to impose new asset freeze 
prohibitions on foreign banks as qualifying 
for such an exception, but a decision to 
impose sanctions on Russian export of  oil 
would not. The former risks asset flight; the 
latter has been in the press for months as a 
possibility.
b. Foreign companies ought to be eligible for 
licenses or similar “safe conduct” passes 
from the US government. At the present 
moment, the best that foreign companies 
can hope for is inclusion of  their business 
under a general license and sufficient 
parallels to US business to avoid sanctions. 
This is a dangerous way to operate for 
foreign businesses. Furthermore, it begs the 
obvious question from foreign businesses: 
if  you can sanction me for conducting 
illegitimate business, can’t you license 
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legitimate business? The US government’s 
disinclination to this practice stems from two 
general arguments: the first is the enormous 
resources that would be consumed in the 
effort, and the second is that it is harder to 
verify that foreign companies are fulfilling 
their obligations under a license.
 For the first, this is a problem that merits 
real discussion between the executive and 
legislative branches: if  sanctions are key 
tools of  US foreign policy, then resources 
ought to be made available to support them 
and not at the expense of  the other vital 
missions conducted by the departments 
responsible for sanctions enforcement. As a 
national security instrument, they ought to 
be given priority in budgeting the same way 
as the Intelligence Community and Defense 
Department. For the second argument, the 
penalties that could be imposed for breach 
of  a license could be severe, just as they 
are for violations of  US export laws for 
the reshipment of  US goods (including 
prohibitions on further export privileges). 
Surely something similarly draconian could 
be a condition of  the breach of  a license. 
This would risk foreign companies still 
deciding not to bother doing business in 
the United States, but at least with such a 
construct, there would be a clear sense that 
US and foreign companies are being treated 
fairly.
5. Consider international approaches to 
sanctions regulation akin to international 
arms control efforts.
From a US perspective, an ideal world would 
permit the United States to retain the ability to 
engage in unilateral action as it sees fit while 
others stand aside. This is not that world, and 
the asymmetric advantages for conducting 
sanctions campaigns presently enjoyed by the 
United States very well may become, at best, 
even competitions. In previous such instances, 
the United States has often looked to constrain 
all sides equally through arms control and similar 
restraint mechanisms.* In the Cold War, this 
became a ban on nuclear testing and eventually 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as well as 
bilateral arms control arrangements between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. In the 
twenty-first century, a similar approach may 
be necessary in order to prevent the abuse of  
sanctions instruments against the United States 
and its partners.
The basis of  such an approach merits further 
analysis, and there are many hurdles in the 
creation of  a “sanctions control” strategy. For 
example, would it be better to seek a global 
consensus on the use of  sanctions (which, 
given global differences of  opinion about 
sanctions as a tool would basically undermine 
any chances of  success), or should regional or 
likeminded coalition approaches be enlisted to 
create smaller blocs that hopefully lead to bigger 
ones via a bottom-up approach (which could 
mean the creation and eventual ossification of  
power blocs within which no sanctions would be 
imposed, but outside of  which sanctions could 
be plentiful)?
Even such a simple question underscores the 
difficulty of  applying arms control principles to 
sanctions. That said, there are a few pillars that 
could form the basis of  a nonbinding “code of  
conduct” that eventually could lead to something 
more permanent. Its pillars could include:
a. Concurrence that sanctions can be legitimate 
tools for national self-defense, but that their 
abuse would have significant consequences 
for the global economy.
1. On that basis, concurrence that the 
preference ought to be on UN-led 
sanctions with national enforcement 
__________________
* The arms control and nonproliferation comparison appeals to this author given his background, but similar examples from 
economic foreign policy (e.g., the WTO system) could also be cited.
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meeting minimum standards.
2. Concurrence that exceptions to this 
standard can be made on the basis of  
national self-defense. However, in this 
case, then it should be standard that 
states provide justification for failure to 
adhere to international guidelines.
b. Development of  standards on acceptable 
means of  applying sanctions, legitimate 
targets, and mitigation measures. There can 
be consideration of  standard approaches to 
humanitarian carve-outs to sanctions, for 
example.
c. Development of  a common set of  
enforcement and evidentiary best practices. 
Classified targeting practices would not 
need to be disclosed, but rather information 
could be shared about how to conduct 
investigations, the burden of  proof  required 
before imposing penalties, and how to work 
with those sanctioned to—eventually—
remove the penalties.
Such an initiative would not be easy to achieve 
Manysimilar projects, including sanctions 
reform at the UN, have been attempted but have 
yet to come close to a common approach for 
how sanctions will be implemented within the 
UN system, let alone among national programs. 
However, as with other difficult international 
issues, this problem will not get easier to solve 
if  ignored on the hope that its salience would 
wane or risks would go away. Instead, it would 
be better to get ahead of  the problem, sooner 
rather than later.
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The recommendations in the previous section all 
offer guidance for the US government but offer little 
of  benefit for US businesses that, if  the US sanctions 
playbook were to be copied by foreign governments, are 
probably the most at risk:
As with the US government, there are three paths 
available to US businesses:
1. Abandon conducting international business to 
avoid future foreign risk;
2. Engage in complex restructuring of  your 
business so as to minimize risk from all 
potential sanctions avenues; and,
3. Incorporate into ongoing risk mitigation efforts 
a structured approach to anticipate and respond 
to future sanctions risk.
The first two options can be generously described as 
straw men, considering that they would require complex 
and expensive contortions to be undertaken in response 
to unrealized risks now. Instead, as Peter Harrell (a 
former deputy assistant secretary of  state responsible for 
economic sanctions and colleague) observed, companies 
should begin to evaluate now the future risks to their 
supply chains and operations from foreign sanctions 
efforts and design game plans for responding to them.33 
Additional analytic work could be done to develop an 
approach for assessing potential risks, but an elementary 
approach could involve a simple inclusion into everyday 
risk assessments the likelihood of  sanctions being 
imposed on the country involved in the next one, three, 
and five years. The risk could be assigned a standard 
value, which then would need to be built into the overall 
risk assessment for those countries of  expropriation, 
recession, or other economic problems. Even an arbitrary 
rating system—assigning “1” for low risk and “5” for 
high risk—could at least help companies work through 
both the 1) likelihood of  sanctions being imposed and 
2) vulnerability to the core operations of  the company 
from sanctions that halted their ability to conduct 
business. Moreover, such an appraisal system would then 
prompt additional scrutiny of  high-risk jurisdictions by 
those companies, permitting their executives to make a 
clear-eyed appraisal of  the risk/reward calculus involved 
in business in those countries.
In any event, both US and foreign companies would be 
well warned to begin calibrating their future investment 
decisions with a responsible appreciation of  future 
sanctions risk, to ensure that contracts they write with 
risky jurisdictions include force majeure clauses covering 
sanctions, and consider seeking insurance options for 
sanctions risk.
WHAT ABOUT BUSINESSES?
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CONCLUSION
Sanctions are here to stay. They offer the promise 
of  strategic pressure on diverse adversaries without 
requiring the use of  force. They fit within the general 
mold of  a diplomatic effort while granting backbone to 
the talking. And, they use the growing importance of  the 
integrated global economy for their effect, thereby neatly 
taking advantage of  global facts on the ground to create 
an opportunity for national statecraft.
The United States, as the innovative force behind 
most global sanctions efforts, has developed a clear, 
asymmetric sanctions advantage, in part drawing on its 
economic power. As a consequence, US policymakers 
are inclined to keep using the tool whenever convenient.
However, there is danger in that convenience. By creating 
sanctions precedents and a permissive global norm to 
their use nationally, the United States may have also laid 
the foundation for a counteroffensive from its strategic 
adversaries and economic competitors that will seek to 
use their own asymmetric advantages in furtherance of  
their own aims. Readers may disagree that this is a high-
risk scenario and suggest that, as with many other such 
claims, warnings of  imminent US decline are overblown. 
That said, even if  one takes this view, the US government 
has a responsibility to plan for even low-likelihood 
scenarios if  they bring with them high risk.
It is therefore in the US strategic interest to seek ways 
to mitigate this future risk and to seek common ground 
with other states that might, one day, see it in their 
interest to apply the same lessons learned by Washington 
since 2000. Sanctions have been useful, but, like many 
things, the cost of  this utility may not be borne until 
years to come.
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The Kurdish Regional Government completed the 
construction and commenced crude exports in an 
independent export pipeline connecting KRG oilfields 
with the Turkish port of  Ceyhan. The first barrels of  
crude shipped via the new pipeline were loaded into 
tankers in May 2014. Threats of  legal action by Iraq’s 
central government have reportedly held back buyers 
to take delivery of  the cargoes so far. The pipeline can 
currently operate at a capacity of  300,000 b/d, but the 
Kurdish government plans to eventually ramp-up its 
capacity to 1 million b/d, as Kurdish oil production 
increases. 
Additionally, the country has two idle export pipelines 
connecting Iraq with the port city of  Banias in Syria and 
with Saudi Arabia across the Western Desert, but they 
have been out of  operation for well over a decade. The 
KRG can also export small volumes of  crude oil to Tur-
key via trucks. 

